Distributed Hash Tables for Peer-to-Peer Mobile Ad-hoc Networks with Security Extensions

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Abstract—Serverless distributed computing, especially Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks (MANETs) have received significant attention from the research community. Peer-to-peer overlay networks have the potential to accommodate large-scale, decentralised applications that can be integrated into a MANET architecture to enable peer-to-peer communication among different mobile peers. These overlay architectures must be very resilient and their utilisation, reliability and availability must satisfy the needs of mobile computing. One must also heed the fact that the wireless nature of the medium introduces security vulnerabilities. The aim of the work described in this paper is twofold. First, we describe our peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT) architecture entitled Reliable Overlay Based Utilisation of Services and Topology (ROBUST). This is designed to be efficiently applied to MANETs. We additionally propose security extensions to protect the ROBUST signalling messages against malicious activities. We evaluate the ROBUST performance as well as the security extensions under varying levels of mobility and network sizes by building a custom DHT module for the network simulator ns-2. The outcome of the results show negligible overhead introduced by the extensions giving credence to their application in security sensitive scenarios.

Index Terms—peer-to-peer, mobile ad-hoc networks, distributed hash tables, security

I. INTRODUCTION

The increase in computing power over time has caused an evolution in every day personal computers and laptops making them lightweight and portable with capabilities to act as both routers and clients in the network. This has spawned the creation of Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs), which encompass the peer-to-peer (P2P) ad hoc paradigm. In MANETs all peers are able to send and retrieve data independently as well as act as routers (or intermediaries) for clients whom need to send data over multiple hops as a result of the target peer being physically further away than the maximum transmittable range of the source peer.

The motive for using MANETs is that no additional infrastructure is needed other than the devices themselves. Therefore to exploit the synergy of the peer-to-peer paradigm of MANETs, one must look towards an integrated solution to applications and information sharing, such as Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). The motive for using DHT in MANETs is due to an extremely quick setup time in both application and network layer in addition to the fact that no additional infrastructure is needed in either layer other than the devices themselves. DHTs allow us to find the exact location of a party or piece of information stored within the network, using a piece of simple meta-data for example a name and domain, as proposed in Peer-to-Peer Session Initiation Protocol (P2PSIP). However the use of DHTs is not limited to simple name resolution and their distributed structure also allows for fast propagation and high availability of information through the network. When applied to MANETs which have no central authority, DHTs could provide the answer to distributed services such as DNS (Domain Name System), P2PSIP, distributed storage and information sharing, whilst aiding service lookup and discovery. Last but not least, all types of data could be stored redundantly and accessed easily and quickly by any peer.

A. Related Work

The area of research dedicated to aid the reduction of overhead from application layer architectures such as DHTs has seen significant activity in the recent past. A great amount of said research falls within the realm of static networks and Internet architectures, however a moderate amount of research can also be attributed to solutions in MANETs. We will have a overview of the aforementioned works in this section.

The paper [1] describes an algorithm designed to create a perfect-ring overlay in order to distribute messages to peers within a certain overlay group. A perfect-ring overlay is denoted as an overlay where sent messages are unidirectional and traverse all peers within a group once, before returning to the originator of the message. This can be useful when peers form groups or clusters which can be linked together in a ring structure. Whilst most DHT-overlays use a single-ring structure, the architecture proposed in [1] uses disjoint paths and routes for connecting overlay peers whom do not form part of the main ring. The algorithm is not reliant on any underlying infrastructure thus the overlay can function independently of the network layer and still be efficient. Another scientifically interesting issue is that the topology mismatch problem where the overlay network topology does not match that of the underlying network causing the overlay network to stretch out over the physical network. This issue must be considered in all DHTs designed for MANETs. In [1] the authors propose to...
negate the problem by sending messages with very short Time To Live (TTL) when setting up the overlay. This creates an overlay with very strong proximity between the peers. The size of an optimised ring transmitted by a member of a group containing $N$ members is $O(2N) \sim O(N)$.

The authors of [2] specifically examine cross-layer DHT MANET protocols. The examined architectures are Etka [3], Mobile Peer-to-peer Protocol (MPP) [4], a Gnutella optimisation for MANETs [5], FastTrack over AODV (Ad hoc On-demand Distance Vector) [6], and MADPastry [7]. Amongst these architectures, Etka and MADPastry are structured peer-to-peer overlays whilst the rest are unstructured. The Etka [3] architecture tightly integrates the structured P2P protocol based on DHTs with the routing architecture of MANETs by mapping logical DHT peer IDs to their MANET IP based counterparts causing the two separate architectures to merge into one structure. This is achieved by integrating the Pastry DHT with the DSR (Dynamic Source Routing) MANET multi-hop routing protocol at the network layer. MADPastry [7] is a DHT substrate which acts by combining the Pastry DHT with AODV MANET routing at the network layer. This can lower the overhead needed to maintain the DHT. While the architecture utilises three different routing tables (One akin to AODV’s routing table, another akin to Pastry’s routing table, and a leafset table) the only table requiring proactive management is that of the leafset table, with peers pinging their left and right respective leafs. The additional tables are updated by overhearing data packets destined for other peers.

In the majority of the proposed DHTs for MANETs published in the bibliography little thought has been given to security considerations. Especially, in all of the papers regarding DHT MANET protocols there is no mention of security for the DHT signalling messages. The most of the DHT-based P2P protocols take for granted that the participating peers behave legitimately and abstain from implementing major security measures. The latter are expected to be employed by software implementations that defend the P2P network against potential adversaries.

Adversaries within a P2P MANET network [8] are those peers which intentionally do not follow the protocol rules. For instance, a malicious peer might provide legitimate peers with erroneous lookup results or inoperative data. In addition, as far as P2P systems inherently rely on the relationships among the participated peers, trust issues arise with a need to be addressed by proper security extensions regarding signalling messages.

B. Contributions

In this paper we will describe our P2P DHT for MANETs entitled ROBUST (Reliable Overlay Based Utilisation of Services and Topology). ROBUST aims at decreasing the average path length and lookup time when sending DHT messages thereby decreasing stretch, while decreasing the maximum path length from the accepted $O(\log N)$ standard in DHTs designed for static networks to $O(\log C)^1$ complexity seen in most common DHTs used today.

In addition to the above, we will describe security extensions for ROBUST to protect the signalling messages against cryptanalysers. These extensions include (i) a key exchange phase where ROBUST peers exchange a pairwise symmetric key $K_{pk}$ with their leafset peers as well as their super peers, (ii) a key refresh phase where peers generate new key material and exchange it with their leafset peers as well as their super peers, (iii) a proximity synchronisation phase where peers that wish to join a new cluster, to lower delay, have to accomplish a secure handshake and exchange key material with their new super peer and leafset peers.

C. Analysis and structure of this paper

In this paper we have first theoretically described the ROBUST DHT architecture as well as its security extensions. We have explained why ROBUST DHT is a suitable solution for MANETs and we have then discussed the total packet overhead of the architecture mentioning all the different packet types. To evaluate the performance of the architecture we have developed a module$^2$ for ns-2 (network simulator) which simulates the ROBUST DHT and its security features for MANETs at the packet-level.

The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section II we describe and discuss the Reliable Overlay Based Utilisation of Services and Topology (ROBUST) DHT scheme and its security extensions. In section III we describe the different types of packets of our model as well as the overhead introduced by these packets. In section IV we present the performance evaluation in terms of ns-2 simulation results. Section V concludes this paper discussing the benefits and the limitations of our solutions as well as our plans for future.

II. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE

Our proposed architecture is entitled ROBUST DHT [9] which stands for Reliable Overlay Based Utilisation of Services and Topology. The aim of the architecture is to decrease the average path length and lookup time when sending DHT messages thereby decreasing stretch, while decreasing the maximum path length from the $O(\log N)$ complexity seen in most common DHTs used today, where $N$ is the number MANET peers.

The concept central to our DHT is to use a clustered hierarchical topology. This means peers will be clustered together based on proximity in the underlying MANET. The peers will be connected via a super peer which keeps track of peers within the cluster and also carries out cluster maintenance. Cluster peers will be able to communicate with one another, however peers within each cluster will forward their queries to their dedicated super peer, if the destination lies outside of the cluster, the

$^1$where $N$ is the number of peers in the DHT and $C$ is the number of clusters in ROBUST DHT.$^2$using C++ and TCL programming languages.
peer will forward the query to the super peer responsible for the destination peer, the destination peer will then reply to the request.

At any given time we need $C$ clusters where $C = \frac{N}{\log_2 N}$ and $N$ is the total number of peers in the network. This gives us a total routing complexity of $O(\log_2 C) + O(1)$ and $O(\log_2 C) \leq O(\log_2 N)$.

To address the issue of scalability and reduce any one super peer from being bottlenecked, more clusters would need to be factored into the DHT as the amount of peers increases. We propose to investigate two algorithms to increase the number of clusters. The first of which is when $\frac{N}{\log_2 N} > 2C$ where $C$ is the current number of super peers, each cluster will split their responsible ID space by $2$. This maintains a balanced load and only creates more overhead due to moving keys at $2C$. In the second algorithm we increase the number of clusters for every $C = \frac{N}{\log_2 N}$ and would need to decrease the size of each cluster by:

$$\frac{100}{C} - \frac{100}{\left(\frac{N}{\log_2 N}\right)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (1)

percent where $C$ is the amount of current clusters. Decreasing the size of each cluster would leave ID space between each cluster, therefore each cluster would need to be moved in order to create a seamless ID space, resulting in a need to move a total of:

$$\frac{\log_2 N^2}{100} - \frac{100}{\left(\frac{N}{\log_2 N}\right)}$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

data keys when the number of keys each peer is responsible for is $O(\log_2 N)$ keys.

When the number of peers in the DHT decreases, there is no longer a need for so many clusters if $C < \frac{N}{\log_2 N}$ however to limit overhead and to maintain a threshold, the number of clusters will only be decreased when $\frac{N}{\log_2 N} < 2C$. This adaptive quality means that the overlay can maintain a lower number of total hops during lookups and decrease lookup latency whilst still being scalable and load balanced. When building the algorithm it has been specifically modelled to deal with a lower number of peers than that of DHTs created for use in massive networks. For instance DHT’s used on the Internet can encompass thousands of peers, we do not currently foresee such possibilities in MANETs due to the restrictions of the routing protocols later discussed in this paper.

Peer proximity is central to our algorithm and we have designed the architecture with this notion in mind. From the start when peers join the overlay they contact the nearest bootstrap peer, which is the nearest super peer. If the number of peers within the cluster is less than $\log_2 N$ the peer will join that cluster after being given a $peerID$ by the super peer in order to maintain ID space equality. If the the number of peers within the cluster is equal to $\log_2 N$ the super peer will forward the join request to its closest two super peers (the first numerically greater than and less than its own $peerID$) these super peers will then run the same algorithm until the peer has joined a cluster with a free space. The maximum number of steps to find a non-full cluster is denoted as $O(\log_2 C)$.

The next step is to take into account mobility. When peers move through the physical space, they may be closer physically to another super peer. In order to maintain proximity a function aptly named proximity synchronisation is proposed. This is achieved by super peers periodically broadcasting a beacon to each of the peers within their cluster, these peers then forward the beacon to any peers around them with a 1 hop Time To Live (TTL). The result of this function is that if a peer moves closer to another super peer, it can ping the newly discovered super peer and compare its latency with the current super peer with which it has established communications. If the newly discovered super peer is closer, the peer sends a move request to the relevant super peer, if the cluster is not full the peer leaves the overlay with its current ID and rejoins with an ID issued by the new super peer. This only happens periodically to limit overhead and the problem of a peer intermittently switching between two close super peers.

The last factor taken into account in this paper for the proposed architecture is that of super peer election, the super peer should be the peer whom is optimally suited to take the role. Therefore factors such as throughput, remaining battery power and latency should be taken into account. It is proposed that periodically the current super peer will poll all of the peers within its cluster for a reliability metric $u$ every 300 seconds so that the network is not over saturated with super peer changes. The reliability metric is calculated as the following; $u = w_1 t + w_2 b + w_3 l$. To allow flexibility in different scenarios, $w_i$ values are weights given to increase or decrease the impact factor of a given metric. The values of $t$, $b$ and $l$ are measured by some threshold denoted as $[v_1, v_2, ..., v_j]$ where a higher value equates to higher reliability. The data values used to calculate the reliability metric are as follows; maximum throughput $t$ in bits per second, remaining battery power $b$ as a percentage of remaining power, and latency $l$ which is the average latency between the peer and every peer in the cluster. This metric allows us to simply select the peer with the highest reliability metric to be the super peer.

A. ROBUST Signalling

This section describes the signalling packets needed to maintain the ROBUST DHT. The model consists of the list of inputs followed by the computational functions, followed by a practical example in the performance evaluation section. The formulas also indicate the packet overhead which provide insight into the efficiency of the proposed architecture due to the sensitivity of MANETs to network congestion when a high number of packets are being exchanged. This can be evidenced by the large number of duplicate packets sent and received by MANET nodes on the transport layer due to expiring of the round trip timer which is estimated using previous sent packets. Thus, the higher the amount of packets being routed around the MANET the higher the delay.
jitter occurs causing high variance in round trip time (RTT); causing even more duplicate packets.

Within the DHT, single overlay hops can be attributed to multiple physical hops on the underlying network. Thus, in a typical overlay we can denote the upper bound on hops as $DHT_{hmax} = O(\log_2 n)$ where $n$ is equal to the total number of peers in the overlay network. However in ROBUST we reduce this by routing request through super peers and hence having an upper bound on hops described as $DHT_{hmax} = O(\log_2 C)$.

In the model we assume the underlying transport layer protocol is UDP as used in OpenDHT [10] this is due to the fact that the DHT must have access to transport information in order make decisions such as whether to remove a peer due to packet loss, we expect reliable transfers by use of acknowledgement packets and sequence numbers in the DHT and the use of round trip timers. We can calculate the total packets (space) needed for DHT data gathering, and overlay maintenance for each peer denoted as:

$$DHT_{proc} = DHT_{get}(\text{no\_gets}) + DHT_{put}(\text{no\_puts}) + DHT_{req}(\text{req\_req}) + DHT_{sync}(\text{sync\_sync}) + DHT_{ls\_sync}(\text{ls\_sync}) + DHT_{ping}(\text{ping\_ping}) + DHT_{distr\_beacon}(\text{distr\_beacon}) + DHT_{ls\_distr\_beacon}(\text{ls\_distr\_beacon}) + DHT_{move\_req}(\text{move\_req})$$

where the DHT functions are denoted below. First DHT gets (data retrieval) are calculated as follows:

$$DHT_{get} = 2DHT_{get\_req} \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot \text{no\_gets} \cdot (4)$$

This equation has been derived based on the fact that there are two packet types sent for one get request (GET and GET\_SUCCESS) therefore the total must be multiplied by a factor of 2, we then take into account each overlay hop denoted as $DHT_{hmax}$ and multiply it for the total number of gets for the systems, in order to get the spacial overhead. Similarly we calculate all puts in the DHT as:

$$DHT_{put} = 2DHT_{put\_req} \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot \text{no\_puts} \cdot (5)$$

We then calculate the packets required for data synchronisation across all peers for a particular given leafset:

$$DHT_{sync} = (DHT_{sync\_vals} + DHT_{str\_keys}) \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot T \cdot \text{t\_sync} \cdot (6)$$

where $DHT_{sync\_vals}$ is the synchronisation request packet, $DHT_{str\_keys}$ are the storage keys held at the leafset peer for which both the requesting peer and the leafset peer are responsible and $t\_sync$ is the periodic synchronisation interval. The function for leafset updating is denoted as:

$$DHT_{ls\_sync} = (DHT_{pull\_ls} + DHT_{push\_ls}) \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot T \cdot \text{t\_ls} \cdot (7)$$

where $DHT_{pull\_ls}$ denotes the leafset pull request, $DHT_{push\_ls}$ denotes the keys of all the leafset peers required and $t\_ls$ equates to the periodic leafset update interval. We can describe the function for peers joining the overlay as:

$$DHT_{join} = DHT_{join\_req} \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot C \cdot \text{no\_joins} \cdot (8)$$

where $DHT_{join\_req}$ equates to the join request packet, which is forwarded to the nearest super peer with a free space in the cluster $C$ this is multiplied by the number of peers which join the network $\text{no\_joins}$. We can calculate all pings in the DHT as:

$$DHT_{ping} = DHT_{ls\_peer} \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot DHT_{ls\_ping} \cdot C \cdot \text{no\_joins} \cdot (9)$$

We will now examine the Proximity synchronisation function, which is called periodically at every time period containing its own information to all of its 1 hop neighbours ($DHT_{1\_hop}$) to determine whether the peer has a better like to the new super peer rather than its old super peer, we can describe this transaction as:

$$DHT_{distr\_beacon} = (DHT_{get\_beacon} + DHT_{put\_beacon}) \cdot DHT_{hmax} \cdot t\_beacon \cdot (10)$$

We then calculate the packets required for data synchronisation across all peers for a particular given leafset:

$$DHT_{sync} = (DHT_{move\_req} + DHT_{move\_rep} + DHT_{part\_part} \cdot DHT_{hmax} + DHT_{broadcast\_broadcast} DHT_{ls\_req} + 3DHT_{ls\_ls} + 3DHT_{sync} \cdot DHT_{move\_rep})$$

where $DHT_{move\_req}$ is the request to join the new cluster, sent from the joining peer to the super peer called $SP'$. $DHT_{move\_rep}$ is the reply from the super peer $SP$ to the joining peer indicating whether there is room in the cluster for the peer to join. $DHT_{part\_part}$ is a packet sent from the joining peer to the super peer $SP'$ indicating that the joining peer is leaving the cluster for which $SP$ is responsible. The super peer $SP$ will then remove the joining peer from its leafset if the peer is included...
and removes the peer from its cluster set which contains information about all of the peers within the cluster for which \( SP \) is responsible. \( DHT_{\text{broadcast, part}} \) symbolises the packets sent from \( SP \) to all of the peers within the original leafset (\( DHT_{1a} \)) of the joining peer relaying to them the information that the joining peer has left the cluster. These peers will then remove the joining peer from their leafset. \( DHT_{\text{move, peer}} \) refers to the number of peers with high enough mobility in order to pass the mobility awareness threshold which is derived by comparing the round trip time (RTT) found by \( DHT_{\text{clstr, beacon}} \) of \( SP \) and \( SP' \). We finally calculate the total number of acknowledgement messages needed to acknowledge all the above mentioned packets as follows:

\[
DHT_{\text{ack}} = DHT_{\text{get}} + DHT_{\text{put}} + DHT_{\text{sync}} + DHT_{\text{is, up}} + DHT_{\text{ping}} + DHT_{\text{clstr, beacon}} + DHT_{\text{prox, sync}} 
\]

\( (12) \)

B. Assumptions and limitations of ROBUST DHT

One limitation of the ROBUST DHT appears when a super peer disconnects from the network. This causes temporary instability in the DHT as a new super peer will need to be elected. During this time DHT routing from and to the affected cluster will be lengthened from \( O(\log C) \) to \( O(\log N) \). This occurs due to peers falling back to traditional DHT routing using their leafset peers to route information.

Another limitation of ROBUST DHT is based on the restrictions of MANET routing protocols, at the time of writing IETF has two main RFCs in this area and work is ongoing. Due to the still experimental protocols being used in MANETs, with larger networks high delay and packet loss can be expected, which invariably affects the DHTs functionalities. We try to counter this by making the DHT topology as close as possible to that of the MANET in order to lower the overhead incurred. One of the main reasons for this discrepancy is due to frequent route changes which can cause multiple duplicate packets and network congestion as described in the paper [11]. This was later confirmed by the authors in [12] where using a real-world testbed implementation of OLSR, the authors found mobility incurs a large delay even for a small sized MANET, in this specific case the authors used up to 5 MANET peers and experienced an end-to-end delay of over 3 seconds due to transport layer and interference issues.

In Fig. 1 we show an overview of the DHT architecture. The box at the top of the figure represents a top down overview of the network containing two clusters where \( C_1 \) represents cluster 1 and \( C_2 \) represents cluster 2. The dashed lines around these clusters represent the broadcast radius for the super peers for each cluster \( SP_1 \) and \( SP_2 \) respectively. Each step of the diagram is explained in detail below:

1) Peer \( P_1 \) moves out of transmission range of super peer \( SP_1 \) and subsequently into transmission range of super peer \( SP_2 \), therefore receiving the \( DHT_{\text{clstr, beacon}} \) packet from said super peer and gaining knowledge of its presence.
2) \( P_1 \) then compares \( SP_1, \text{RTT} \) with \( SP_2, \text{RTT} \) over a period of \( 3\,\text{beacon} \) to confirm the results with the realisation \( SP_2, \text{RTT} < SP_1, \text{RTT} \). \( P_1 \) therefore sends a \( DHT_{\text{move, req}} \) packet to \( SP_2 \) to ascertain whether there is space in the cluster for the peer to join (as previously stated clusters can must be within size \( \log_2 N \) with a variance of \( \pm 2 \) peers in order to maintain an equally distributed ID space).
3) \( SP_2 \) sends \( P_1 \) a \( DHT_{\text{move, rep}} \) packet stating if there is indeed room in the cluster and if so, sends a new ID prefix for peer \( P_1 \) and also the IPs of \( P_1 \)’s new closest predecessor (closest peer ID lower than \( P_1 \)) and successor (closest peer ID higher than \( P_1 \)) in the cluster.
4) If there is space for \( P_1 \) to join the cluster \( C_2 \), it then sends a \( DHT_{\text{part}} \) packet to its previous super peer \( SP_1 \) notifying it that \( P_1 \) is leaving the cluster and subsequently removes all previous nodes from its leafset.
5) Upon \( SP_1 \) receiving the \( DHT_{\text{part}} \) packet, it first sends a \( DHT_{\text{broadcast, part}} \) packet to \( P_1 \)’s previous leafset peers notifying them that \( P_1 \) has left the cluster, they subsequently remove the peer from all of their DHT routing tables as does \( SP_1 \).
6) \( P_1 \) then sends a \( DHT_{\text{is, up}} \) packet to its predecessor and successor nodes, they add the node to their leafset and reply to \( P_1 \) with the leafset peers which fall within \( P_1 \)’s leafset.
7) The leafset nodes of peer \( P_1 \) learn of his existence through the leafset update function which runs every \( t_{\text{ls}} \) period and chooses a random existing
leafset peer to sync with.
8) The leafset peers of $P_1$ run the $DHT_{sync}$ data synchronisation function every $t_{sync}$ interval randomly choosing a leafset peer to synchronise data values for which both the peers are responsible. In this way peer $P_1$ will receive all of the data values it is responsible for.
9) Peer $P_2$ of cluster $C_1$ submits a $DHT_{get,req}$ to its super peer $SP_1$ whom then compares the ID lookup stored in the request with the ID’s of all of the other super peers in the overlay which it knows of.
10) $SP_1$ then forwards the request to the super peer with the closest peer ID to that of the ID stored in the request which in this case is $SP_2$.
11) $SP_2$ receives the $DHT_{get,req}$ and forwards it to the peer within the cluster with the closest peer ID to the ID stored in the request which is $P_1$.
12) Peer $P_1$ receives the request and sends the data stored under the specified ID directly back to $P_2$ using its IP address.

C. Security Extensions

According to ROBUST different types of signalling messages have to be exchanged amongst peers during the networks’ lifetime. Thus potential attackers could find a way to exploit security vulnerabilities which appear due to the transmission of these messages. To give a clear picture of how harmful the existence of malicious peers against the ROBUST DHT can be we have derived the maximum length of an overlay (logical) route in hops between a source and a destination peer. This is equal to $\log C + 2$ where $C$ is the number of clusters in the overlay network. Further, $C = \left\lceil \frac{N}{\log_2 N} \right\rceil$ namely the maximum length of an overlay route is

$$\log N - \log(\log N) + 2$$ (13)

Assuming that the probability of a peer to be malicious is $m$ the probability to have a secure route namely a route that consists only of legitimate peers is equal to

$$P_{secure,route} = (1 - m)^{\log N - \log(\log N) + 2}$$ (14)

From this we can derive that the impact of the attacker is severe even for a small fraction of malicious peers. Thus security provisions to maintain reliable communication under malicious activities must be provided.

To cope with external adversaries the ROBUST DHT needs to be extended in a way that peers will exchange cryptographic material. In this context we describe in the following how peers as well as super peers exchange cryptographic pairwise symmetric keys. These keys will then be used to encrypt ROBUST signalling information in a pairwise manner. This means that each pair of peers (including super peers) will use a specific symmetric key to encrypt the signalling information.

We assume that in the beginning of the networks life, a global 128-bit symmetric AES (Advanced Encrypted Standard) pre-shared key called a network wide key ($K_{nwk}$) has been installed in all the devices of the mobile peers. Similarly groups of users who wish to share data securely can use such a pre-shared key much like common security encryption standards use today for example Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and 802.11i pre-shared key mode (PSK). The use of $K_{nwk}$ defends a MANET against man-in-middle attacks during the exchange of the peers’ pairwise symmetric keys. Another way of acquiring the $K_{nwk}$ it could consider a secure side channel (e.g. Bluetooth) communication or physical contact in the beginning of the network’s lifetime. It is also worth mentioning here that the use of symmetric rather than asymmetric cryptography is due to asymmetric cryptographic algorithms being in the order of 1000 times slower than symmetric algorithms as well as they introduce higher energy cost [13].

On the other hand, the reason why we do not use the $K_{nwk}$ for the duration of the network’s lifetime is due to the ample opportunities for cryptanalysers to retrieve the key material. By exchanging pairwise symmetric keys and refreshing at a certain interval we minimise the risk of successful cryptanalysis activities whilst we prevent compromised peers to read information exchanged between other peers assuming that there is very limited probabilities a peer to be compromised before the exchange of the pairwise symmetric keys.

The security extensions for the ROBUST signalling messages consist of three main phases as described in the following:

- **key exchange** phase: during this phase ROBUST peers exchange their pairwise 128-bit AES symmetric keys $K_{pwk}$ with their leafset peers and their super peers by sending a $DHT_{key,exch}$. To this end, peers use the $K_{nwk}$ to encrypt the $DHT_{key,exch}$ as well as the ROBUST packet header.
- **key refresh** phase: the task of this phase is for any given peer to generate new key material and exchange with their leafset peers and super peer by sending them a $DHT_{key,refr}$ every $t_{key,refr}$ seconds. For the encryption and transmission of the new keys, peers use the previous established symmetric keys $K_{pwk}$.
- **proximity synchronisation** phase: during this phase peers move closer to a new super peer $SP'$ and consequently should move to the new cluster by adopting a new ID in the DHT space. In this case, peers must use the $K_{nwk}$ to send their symmetric keys to their new leafset peers in addition to the new super peer. Therefore before they join the new cluster they send a $DHT_{part}$ packet to all of their previous leafset peers and super peer.

All phases consist of a 2-way handshake between two peers as illustrated in Fig. 2 and 3. It is worth stressing here the following:

- Since the security extension algorithm is distributed, there is a possibility both peers that participate in a handshake send their $K_{pwk}$ to each other at almost exactly the same time consequently having two different $K_{pwk}$ at the end of the handshake. To
avoid this issue, we have assumed that both peers keep track of the exact time they send their $K_{pwk}$. If they receive a $K_{pwk}'$ from the target peer before they receive an acknowledgement for the $K_{pwk}$ they previously sent, they will compare the send time of the received $K_{pwk}'$ with the time they sent the $K_{pwk}$ to the target node if the send time of $K_{pwk}' < K_{pwk}$ they will discard the key $K_{pwk}'$ and use $K_{pwk}$ for encryption with the target peer following suit.

- The 2 steps in the handshake combined with a round trip timer are adequate to guarantee that the sender of the $K_{pwk}$ will know that the other peer has received the $\{K_{pwk}\}K_{nwk}$, when it receives the acknowledgement in the second step of the handshake. If the sender of the $K_{pwk}$ does not receive the aforesaid acknowledgement within the certain RTT (round trip time), it resends the key packet to the target peer assuming the original packet was dropped.

- The purpose of the key refresh is to harden the ability of a compromised peer to reveal any pairwise key material and information from any encrypted signalling packets. This is based on the fact that a compromised peer would need to overhear the key exchange of the first pairwise key which is encrypted with the $K_{nwk}$ in addition to the subsequent keys thereafter making it extremely hard for an attacker even with the $K_{nwk}$ to decrypt refreshed $K_{pwk}$ messages.

- To satisfy confidentiality for the different DHT signalling packets, as previously presented, we use one of the $K_{nwk}$, $K_{pwk}$ depending on the type of the ROBUST packet.

In Table I we summarise the different DHT signalling packets as well as the required keys per packet type regarding the different phases of the proposed security extensions. Authentication and integrity are both satisfied by ROBUST using HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code). To this end, a hash function is applied to the cipher-text of the message using the proper symmetric key, depending on the DHT signalling packet type. The receiver of the signalling checks the message digest to verify the authenticity of the sender and to identify whether the message was altered compared to the one sent by the originator (due to intermediate MANET nodes routing the packet).

### D. Assumptions and limitations of the Security Extensions

One of the limitations of our work, is the use of a common symmetric key called network wide key ($K_{nwk}$) shared amongst all the peers. Within this context, we assume that in the beginning of the network's life a $K_{nwk}$ has been installed in all the devices of the mobile peers. Another way of acquiring the $K_{nwk}$ could be established by peers initiating security association amongst each other by means of secure side channel (e.g. bluetooth) communication or physical contact in the beginning of the network's lifetime.

A further assumption of the security extensions for ROBUST signalling messages is that the beacon packet used to advertise super peers existence in order to estimate proximity to said super peer by a normal DHT peer must always be encrypted by the $K_{nwk}$ due to its broadcast nature.

Regarding the proximity synchronisation phase we have assumed that peers joining a cluster communicate the new pairwise symmetric key for future transactions with their new super peer, as well as their new leafset peers. This is accomplished by using the $K_{nwk}$ as the overhead required to use existing secure channels is deemed to outweigh the risks.

### III. Performance Evaluation

In this section, we use simulations to verify the integrity of the proposed model and showcase the benefits of using our proposed solution. We next use an event based simulator, customised with our implementation of ROBUST protocol, to validate the proposed model and optimisation solution. The authors have developed a simulator module for the packet-level network simulator ns-2. The simulator incorporates all DHT packets and functions needed for a fully implemented DHT and the implementation is based on the ROBUST DHT clustered architecture with dynamic mobility considerations. In addition, the different phases of the security extensions are implemented fully in ns-2 and are utilised in order to route ROBUST packets. Further lower layers are also simulated in the ns-2 simulator and these characteristics are taken into account.

The setup of our network comprises of randomly distributed peers throughout an area of $1\text{km}^2$. For smaller

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3 the notation $\{A\}_K$ means that A has been encrypted with the cryptographic key $K$.

4 going through their previous super peer $SP$ for which both the joining peer and the $SP'$ have established pairwise symmetric keys.
networks such as ten peers, the peers are considerably closer together in order to stay within transmission range of one another. Puts and Gets (Data transmission and retrieval) are called in the DHT at a rate of one request per second. The number of peers simulated ranges from ten peers to seventy peers with increments of twenty peers. The authors specifically chose this amount of peers to represent smaller networks and also investigate the scalability of the aforementioned approaches. During tests the authors found the threshold 90 ms to be sufficient to allow peers to change cluster when \( SN'RTT < SN RTT + 90 \) ms. The threshold is needed so that peers do not move cluster when even a small delay increase is experienced. In addition to the threshold we have also implemented the algorithm to always take the best RTT for the current super peer \( SN \) and the worst RTT for the new super peer \( SN' \) over three subsequent RTTs. This ensures that we can guarantee the super peer \( SN' \) to have a better RTT than \( SN \) for a total duration of \( 3t_{beacon} \). All simulations were run for a total of 1000 seconds simulation time. This was chosen in order for the DHT and network to stabilise. In the simulation experimentations regarding the ROBUST DHT we have assumed static super peers. One of the limitations of our simulations are the fact churn is not simulated per-se. This is due to the fact the authors have decided to only simulate mobility churn in this paper as adding churn would detract from the goal of investigating these results. We consider two main different scenarios in our simulations; one without security extensions (pure ROBUST) and one with security additions for signalling (secure ROBUST). The values for the intervals of the different DHT functions are based on those used in OpenDHT [10]. The list of simulation parameters can be seen in Table II.

### Table II. Simulation Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network size (number of peers)</td>
<td>10, 30, 50, 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of clusters needed (C)</td>
<td>4, 7, 9, 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of mobile peers</td>
<td>0%, 25%, 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area size</td>
<td>1000m x 1000m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data packet payload size</td>
<td>512 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANET Routing protocol</td>
<td>OLSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAC layer</td>
<td>802.11b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link bandwidth</td>
<td>11Mbit/s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum transmission range</td>
<td>250m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Node moving speed</td>
<td>1m/sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of overlay hops</td>
<td>O(\log_2 C) + 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of traffic</td>
<td>UDP (All aforementioned DHT and security packets)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum number of traffic connections</td>
<td>( t_{beacon} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simulation time</td>
<td>1000 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHT data distribution</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHT node ID distribution</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of DHT get requests (( n_{gets} ))</td>
<td>1/sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data synchronisation interval (( t_{sync} ))</td>
<td>3 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leafset update interval (( t_{ls} ))</td>
<td>4 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbour ping interval (( t_{ping} ))</td>
<td>5 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Super peer change RTT threshold</td>
<td>90ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cluster beacon interval (( t_{beacon} ))</td>
<td>10 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key refresh interval (( t_{key,refr} ))</td>
<td>300 sec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proximity synchronisation interval (( t_{prox,sync} ))</td>
<td>60 sec</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The process of packet initialisation to its definitive end is described below.

### Table I. List of required signalling robust packets and associated cryptographic keys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROBUST packet</th>
<th>before the key exchange phase</th>
<th>after the key exchange phase</th>
<th>proximity synchronisation phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DHTget,req</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTput,req</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTping</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTbeacon</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTjoin,req</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTack</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTsync</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTstr,keys</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTpull,ls</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTpush,ls</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTmove,req</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTmove,rep</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTpart</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTbroad,part</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTkey,exch</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHTkey,refr</td>
<td>( K_{nwk} )</td>
<td>( K_{pkw} )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The graph in Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distribution function of end-to-end $DHT_{get,req}$ requests for 10-70 peers in a state with and without security when the network has no mobility (all peers are static). One can see from this figure that when the network is ad-hoc as opposed to mobile ad-hoc the delay experienced when getting data from the DHT is minimal as for 90% of all cases the end-to-end delay is less than 100ms. We can see that in almost all cases the security and non-security scenarios experience roughly the same delay (within a 5ms variance) except for 70 peers where the variance is extended to less than 20ms. The higher experienced delay here for 70 peers without security can be attributed to a slight variation of the distribution of peer and data IDs in the DHT, i.e. the data IDs are distributed more evenly in the non-security scenario creating more $DHT_{sync}$ packets and higher redundancy, at the cost of slightly higher delay.

Fig. 5 demonstrates the cumulative distribution function of end-to-end $DHT_{get,req}$ requests for 10-70 peers in a state with and without security when the network has 25% mobility (25% of the peers are moving at 1m/sec). As one would expect the delay in smaller networks (10-30 peers) is very small with 80% of the round trip times (RTT) being less than 70ms due to no congestion, interference and the fact that peers hardly move out of a 1 hop range. When the network size is increased to 50 peers where 13 peers are moving, we see slightly higher delay due to broken links causing packet retransmission and more packets being sent over the network increasing congestion (primarily $DHT_{sync}$ packets when a node moves cluster). We see this evidently more for 70 peers (18 moving) where the delay increases greatly. The results here show a clear indication that adding the security packets increases delay due to the time the peer has to wait to establish keys before transmitting data, however for 30 and 50 peers this is less than 50ms, whereas for 70 peers this is increased to less than 600ms. The great difference here is due to a much higher rate of peers moving cluster causing higher delays due to packet loss and interference as confirmed in the paper [12]. Packet loss can cause very high delay times in get request RTT such as those experienced here due to the dropped packet timer implemented in ROBUST. Based on the OpenDHT implementation [10] when a packet is sent and a round trip timer is started with an expiry time of the RTT of the last successfully transmitted packet to the specific target peer, if the timer expires the packet is retransmitted and the expiry time is doubled. Due to this the RTT can increase exponentially when experiencing particularly high packet loss.

The graph in Fig. 6 presents the results of the cumulative distribution function for end-to-end $DHT_{get,req}$ requests for 10-70 peers in a state with and without security when the network has 50% mobility (50% of the peers are moving at 1m/sec). In keeping with the results for 25% mobility we can see that the smaller network sizes (10-30) experience less than 210ms delay for 80% of the requests, while this is significantly higher than the previous results, it is not unexpected due to the increasing volatility of the network. In this scenario the network with 50 peers has a sharp increase in the end-to-end delay compared with Fig. 5 due to the aforementioned factors, mainly resultant of peers moving more frequently. One can see
again the overhead of security only marginally affecting the delay with a maximum different with 70 peers of 300ms.

One can see a sample of end-to-end delay for $DHT_{get,req}$ requests for 50 peers with security extensions enabled in Fig. 7 following the trend of the previous graphs we can clearly see that he delay for 50% of the peers mobile is much more varied than the other two scenarios as expected. It is interesting to note that during the stabilisation period of 200 seconds we do not see high delay for any of the scenarios. However when the peers become mobile around 200 seconds the delay for a small percentage of the $DHT_{get,req}$ requests increases rapidly.

Fig. 8 displays the number of peers whom change cluster due the $DHT_{prox, sync}$ which compares the RTT of a new super peer with that of their current super peer. We can see a general trend here which shows that the peers without security change cluster more times than the peers with the security extensions enabled. If we compare this trend to what we see in Figs. 4-6 where the end-to-end delay for scenarios without security is lower, one can see that the $DHT_{prox, sync}$ actually reduces overall end-to-end delay due to greater proximity of the overlay peers to their physical network neighbours.

Fig. 9 represents the total number of packets received during the networks lifetime during each scenario for a given number of peers. Here one can see that for each scenario the security extensions add a noticeable number of packets in the results, but still not enough to add any real difference in terms of congestion. It is interesting to note that for scenarios 10-50 peers the results are hardly distinguishable from each other, this shows that the threshold for $DHT_{prox, sync}$ impacts more in the 70 peer network than all of the others due to higher RTT delay variance.

Confirming the notion in Fig. 9, in Fig. 10 one can determine the actual real number of total security packets received during the networks lifetime to be negligible, with the maximum number of security packets received at 70 peers with 50% mobility as expected due to $DHT_{prox, sync}$. One can say with clarity that adding 3600 packets to a total over $3 \times 10^5$ would not produce any noticeable difference in network behaviour, on the contrary any resulting impact from the security would have to be delay wise, while waiting for a packet to arrive due to the congestion caused by the total number of packets. This is more noticeable with the security extension as one has to wait for this procedure to complete before transmitting secure data. The results in fig. 10 do not include duplicate packets sent, which might result...
in more overall packets being sent from the security function.

The results in Fig. 11 provide insight into the cumulative packet loss experienced during the networks lifetime for any given number of peers simulated for each mobility scenario with and without security. One can gather that while there is packet loss, it is not experienced on a large scale. While the general trend shows that the security scenarios have a slightly higher packet loss, when compared with the total number of packets received this amounts to less than 1 percent. The reason for such a low packet loss can be explained by using the results from the paper [11] as a guide. Due to frequent route change multiple copies of a single packet can be received, this causes a lot of duplicate packets in the network and a phenomenon we experienced with a high impact when mobility is introduced such as the transport issues highlighted in [11] where a high variance in RTT occurs when routes change often, leading to underestimation of RTT for many packets causing unnecessary duplicates to be sent, further congesting the network and increasing delay.

The resulting contributions from this paper are important for the future design and implementation of P2P protocols for MANETs, especially in the cases where data security and confidentiality is of high importance. Future work in the area of P2P for MANETs must address the scalability issues experienced when a high number of peers are mobile. While ROBUST goes some way to addressing this problem with proximity synchronisation, it is clear that a lot of the encountered discrepancies stem from an inefficient transport protocol which should be addressed. The authors main focus of future work will be within the area studying how mobility affects DHTs and solutions to the problems that entails, as well as improving the simulator by adding new transport protocols, adding super peer election, enhancing proximity synchronisation and investigating the effects of churn.

One can clearly see the advantages of having secure P2P overlays in MANETs, adding much functionality to an otherwise desolate landscape in terms of services and information sharing while maintaining secure communication between trusted peers. The advancement of solutions to the problems posed in the previously mentioned scenarios and the continued research into future services will ensure that MANETs do have functionality which goes beyond that of simply acting as gateways to more service rich architectures such as the Internet.

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